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Jurnal Studi Keislaman



Indonesia's Foreign Policy in Promoting a Moderate Islamic Identity after the Reform

Sidrotun Naim, Sabil Mokodenseho

The Role of Al-Qur'an Learning Center for Children in Increasing of Religious Moderation Values in Kenagarian Air Bangis, Pasaman Barat

Musda Asmara, Rahadian Kurniawan, Sarweni Sarweni, Fian Wijayanti

The Influence of Islamic Product Quality and Design on Muslim Consumer Interest in Arung Meubel Products in Sorong City

Rokhimah, Andi Hasrun, Bambang Sunatar, Karfin, Susetyowati Sofia

Revitalization of Moderation Messages in the Madinah Charter: Religious Development Communication Studies

Nazil Mumtaz al-Mujtahid, Hasan Sazali

Zakat Literacy Level of Residents and Muhammadiyah Sympathists in Krajan Village

Lukmanul Hakim, Ikhwan Adriansyah

The Convergence of Maqasid Shari'a and Pancasila in Strengthening the Spirit of Nationalism in Indonesia

Moh Nur Fauzi

Criminal Liability of Children from the Perspective of Islamic Law and Positive Law in Indonesia

Akhmad Sukris Sarmadi, Arne Huzaimah, Jalaluddin, Lahmudinur, Agus Bambang Nugraha, Karimuddin Abdullah Lawang

Science Teaching in Islamic Civilization: an Analysis of Ibn Khaldun's Muqaddimah

Bahrum Subagiya, Endin Mujahidin

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Tables of Content

1-22

**INDONESIA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN PROMOTING A MODERATE ISLAMIC
IDENTITY AFTER THE REFORM**

Sidrotun Naim, Sabil Mokodenseho

23-41

**THE ROLE OF AL-QUR'AN LEARNING CENTER FOR CHILDREN IN INCREASING
OF RELIGIOUS MODERATION VALUES IN KENAGARIAN AIR BANGIS,
PASAMAN BARAT**

Musda Asmara, Rahadian Kurniawan, Sarweni, Fian Wijayanti

42-58

**THE INFLUENCE OF ISLAMIC PRODUCT QUALITY AND DESIGN ON MUSLIM
CONSUMER INTEREST IN ARUNG MEUBEL PRODUCTS IN SORONG CITY**

Rokhimah, Andi Hasrun, Bambang Sunatar, Karfin, Susetyowati Sofia

59-79

**REVITALIZATION OF MODERATION MESSAGES IN THE MADINAH CHARTER:
RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENT COMMUNICATION STUDIES**

Nazil Mumtaz al-Mujtahid, Hasan Sazali

80-97

**ZAKAT LITERACY LEVEL OF RESIDENTS AND MUHAMMADIYAH
SYMPATHISTS IN KRAJAN VILLAGE**

Lukmanul Hakim, Ikhwan Adriansyah

98-115

**THE CONVERGENCE OF MAQASID SHARI'A AND PANCASILA IN
STRENGTHENING THE SPIRIT OF NATIONALISM IN INDONESIA**

Moh Nur Fauzi

116-127

**CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CHILDREN FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF ISLAMIC
LAW AND POSITIVE LAW IN INDONESIA**

Akhmad Sukris Sarmadi, Arne Huzaimah, Jalaluddin, Lahmudinur, Agus Bambang Nugraha,
Karimuddin Abdullah Lawang

128-143

**SCIENCE TEACHING IN ISLAMIC CIVILIZATION: AN ANALYSIS OF IBN
KHALDUN'S MUQADDIMAH**

Bahrum Subagiya, Endin Mujahidin



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*Sidrotun Naim*¹, *Sabil Mokodenseho*²

INDONESIA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN PROMOTING A MODERATE ISLAMIC IDENTITY AFTER THE REFORM

Sekolah Tinggi Manajemen IPMI, Jakarta

Institut Agama Islam Muhammadiyah, Kotamobagu

Email: sidrotun.naim@ipmi.ac.id¹, sabil.mokodenseho@gmail.com².

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Abstract: *This study aims to analyze the factors that have led to changes in Indonesia's foreign policy, which initially avoided the emergence of a moderate Islamic identity but currently makes efforts to promote it. The research is essential as it sheds light on Indonesia's foreign policy practices, which have historically refrained from emphasizing an Islamic identity, despite the country's predominantly Muslim population. Furthermore, this research holds significant importance as it addresses the negative perceptions of Islam, which have often associated it with terrorism, intolerance, and opposition to peace, particularly from Western perspectives. In this study, the researchers utilized a qualitative descriptive method employing content analysis techniques to analyze the collected data. The examination of Indonesia's foreign policy reveals its aspirations to pursue international interests by actively engaging in maintaining global peace and prioritizing a moderate Islamic identity. This study concludes that a moderate Islamic identity, as a facet of identity, is not inherently problematic or conflict-ridden; rather, it has the potential to bridge the divide between the West and Islam. Moreover, Western countries express their desire to cultivate networks of moderate Islam and view Indonesia as a competent partner in countering global terrorist networks. This cooperation stems from the shared principles of democracy and respect for human rights upheld by both the West and Indonesia.*

Keywords: *Democracy, Human Rights; Foreign Policy; Moderate Islamic Identity; Peace*

INTRODUCTION

Islam is a religion believed by most of the Indonesian population. Indonesian Islam has certain distinct characteristics and qualities (Subchi et al., 2022). This is caused by the process of adaptation to local conditions, thus forming distinctive Islamic dynamics (Choi, 2023).

Azra (2002) said the development of Indonesian Islam in the Southeast Asia region was no longer seen from a local perspective but had been seen from a global perspective. In the context of Southeast Asia, Houben (2003) sees Indonesian Islam as the same as Islam that entered Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, and so on because of the way that religion entered and developed under colonialism and after. Although the territory of Indonesia has generally located on the outskirts of the Islamic world, today, many Muslims live in this region.

According to the World Population Review (2021), Indonesia's Muslim population in 2020 reached 229 million or 87.2% of the 273,523,615 population. Although most of the Indonesian population embraces Islam, Indonesia is not a theocratic state that is a form of government where divine principles play a significant role in another sense. Indonesia is not a country built based on one religion but on religious plurality and ethnic pluralism (Alamsyah & Zildjianda, 2020; Riyadi et al., 2019; Saidek et al., 2016). Religious diversity, including ethnicity, language, and customs, is bound by the ideological basis of the state (Pancasila) (Riyadi et al., 2020; Intan, 2019; Wekke, Mokodenseho, & Firdaus, 2017). Abdillah (2020) argued that Pancasila was used as the basis of the state to build the unity of the Indonesian nation by Islamic groups and nationalist groups by making compromises known as national agreements or consensus (*al-mitsāq wathani*). Recognition of pluralism (Budiartha, 2020) also influences Indonesia's foreign policy (Aryani, 2019).

Since the President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono took office in 2004, Indonesia's foreign policy has reflected a moderate Islamic identity. In international forums, Yudhoyono has proven that Islam, modernity, and democracy can go hand in hand. On many occasions, expressions of moderate Islam can be found, for example in the activities of the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF), the World Movement for Democracy (WMD), the Parliamentary Union of the OIC Member States (PUIC), and the International Conference on the Global Movement of Moderates (ICGMM).

This indicates that Indonesia, with its foreign policy, is no longer allergic to Islamic elements in portraying Indonesia's national identity on the international stage (Sukma, 2010). In its development, Indonesia has participated in many national and international forums.

Most of the existing policy studies argue that Indonesia tends to avoid using Islamic symbols with caution when articulating its foreign policy (Gindarsah, 2012; Wicaksana, 2012; Laksana, 2011; Perwita, 2007). This contrasts with most Muslim countries, which generally use the language of Islam to explain and justify to their own citizens what they do abroad (Telhami & Barnett, 2002). The conventional wisdom is that this lack of Islamic symbolism has much to do with the identity difficulties inherent in pluralistic countries like Indonesia (Gindarsah, 2012; Laksana, 2011). This dilemma is reflected in two aspects. Although Muslims make up most of the population, and Indonesia is home to the world's largest Muslim population, Islam is not the official identity of the country. Indonesia's foreign policy prefers to promote its country as a religiously neutral country, where all religions have their place and are protected by the government (Leifer, 1986). Thus, Indonesia's extraordinary pluralism limits the use of Islamic identity in foreign policy rhetoric. However, Islam serves as an important source of societal political legitimacy. The domestic social environment limits what a government can or cannot do in its foreign relations.

Although Islamic symbolism is relatively absent in Indonesia's foreign relations, the belief serves as an influential constraint on several foreign policy issues. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs usually takes a middle ground to overcome these identity difficulties and domestic constraints. Although the Ministry considers carefully and accommodates the aspirations of domestic Muslims in its foreign policy formulation, it tends to avoid referring to Islam as the official framework for its foreign policy or international identity (Azra, 2000).

The discussion of identity in foreign policy is a new problem. In this context, İnaç's study of the issue of Turkish identity during the EU integration process can be put forward. İnaç tries to analyze the polarization and categorization of so-called Turkish identity by comparing three levels: Ottoman modernization; Kemalist modernization in the early period of the newly founded Turkish state; and Westernization within the framework of European Union integration. İnaç (2004) argues that the process of

integrating the European Union as a civilizational project is the inevitable and final circle of two centuries of Westernization efforts. Finally, Turkish identity is faced with the challenge of fighting the culture gap and culture shock. Turkey's social culture, which had extraordinarily strong Islamic and anti-Western values during the Ottoman era, suddenly had to absorb a sense of belonging to Europe to integrate into the European Union. The identity built through Turkey's modernization process has resulted in a subtle rejection of the European Union, which sees that Turkey is not ready to accept Western values, especially regarding its policies and culture. This situation indicates Turkey's failure to translate its identity into the integration process.

In addition, Sadeghi's (2008) study of Iran's foreign policy began with the Islamic Revolution. Using a genealogical approach, he found that the internalization of Islam in the state's life made Islam an inherent identity in Iran. Iran uses it to achieve national interests and change geopolitics in the Middle East through Islamic revivalism. This confrontational revivalism serves not only countries in the Middle East and the former Soviet Union but also the West. He concluded that Iran's Islamic identity is conflictual because Iran is rethinking everything that they think is right, in a direction that is more in line with the spirit of the times and ideals. This indicates that what Iran did has created a dichotomy between itself and the opposing party, especially the United States.

Previous studies have shown how identity causes problems. In the domestic sphere, this problem revolves around the search for and recognition of identity, giving rise to dilemmas and crises, as in the case of Turkey. In the dynamics of the international system, identity shows how anarchy can occur. In the context of Iran, the identity that is presented often sparks conflict with the West, especially the United States. Identity is basically a shared understanding that legalizes the structure so that it organizes the way the state can determine between enemy or friend (Adler-Nissen, 2016; Wendt, 1992). In an anarchic international system, the perception of identity that distinguishes foe and friend is important to becoming the basis for actors in interaction.

This study assumes that the face of identity is not always conflictual and problematic. This study pays attention to the capacity of identity in mediating conflict and highlights the identity of moderate Islam in Indonesia's foreign policy, which is considered capable of bridging the conflict between the West

and Islam. This is important because it relates to the face of Islam, which has been considered a hotbed of terrorists, intolerance, and anti-peace. Assumptions, especially those from the West, cannot be generalized and taken for granted. The purpose of this study is to analyze the causes of changes in Indonesia's foreign policy which initially avoided the possibility of the emergence of an Islamic identity being an effort to promote a moderate Islamic identity. This study provides a new perspective on Islam and presents the face of moderate Islam. Another significance of this study relates to the urgency of Indonesia's position as the largest Muslim country in the world.

METHOD

In foreign policy studies (Aggestam & Johansson, 2017; Aras & Mencutek, 2015; Saraçoğlu & Demirkol, 2014) and international relations studies (Colgan, 2016; Reiter, 2014), qualitative methods with a descriptive approach are suitable for use. Therefore, this study uses a qualitative method with a descriptive approach to examine changes in Indonesia's foreign policy which initially avoided the possibility of the emergence of an Islamic identity in an effort to promote a moderate Islamic identity. The research data was taken from library materials such as journal articles, research reports, books, and various relevant writings, which were widely distributed in the mass media. In addition, seriously studying Indonesia's involvement in various international forums, which talk about religion, peace, tolerance, and so on. The research data collected were analyzed using content analysis techniques.

DISCUSSION

DEFINING IDENTITY IN FOREIGN POLICY

Viotti & Kaupi (2007) define identity as things that arise from basic questions about self-existence (who am I, who are you, or what makes us different from others). All that can only be answered through social interaction. Wendt (1999) identified the types of identity into several types that shape the character of the social interaction process, namely: (1) corporate identity, which occurs from self-organization, including a homeostatic structure that differentiates each actor as a different entity; (2) type identity, which refers to social categories and the use of actor labels, both of which are responsible for sharing several characteristics in appearance, traits, attitudes, behavior, values, skills, knowledge, opinions, experiences, historical similarities, and others; (3) collective identity, which connects

oneself with others through logical conclusions; and (4) role identity, which depends on oneself and the response of others.

From the above definition, actors cannot assign a single identifiable role because identity can only be seen in relationships involving more than one actor. Concerning the context of this study, the role is very much needed in understanding the identity of a country at the international level or in foreign policy.

MODERATE ISLAM: RESPONSE TO ACTS OF TERRORISM

The tragedy of September 11, 2001, or the events of 9/11 that occurred in the World Trade Center (WTC) building is one of the international issues at the beginning of the 21st century. It can be said, this became one of the darkest histories in the history of the United States. Learning of this incident, the Western world, including the US, began to realize that communism was not the only threat to their existence (Ross, 2019), but also Islam. The US then campaigned for war on terrorism. In its development, based on Panagopoulos's (2006) analysis of the development of US public sentiment in the era of the war on terror, it shows that the US has hatred and doubts towards Arabs and US Muslims, as well as the Islamic world in general. This cannot be separated from some unilateral views of the US that a Muslim who has secured himself in Afghanistan, namely Osama Bin Laden (d. 2011), is the perpetrator of the 9/11 terror. In addition, Bin Laden's al-Qaeda organization is said to be a hardline Islamic organization. Therefore, was blamed for the 1998 bombings of two US embassies, that is in Africa that killed 231 people, and the 2000 attack on the US warship "USS Cole" that killed 17 American sailors in Yemen, as well as countless other plots, that were partially successful and others, thwarted (CBC, 2011).

Some of the reasons above are used as a foothold in the US and the West in legalizing military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the masses who oppose Islam excessively tend to occur after President Bush (d. 2018) ignited the spirit of the Crusade in the war on terrorism. This war was translated by the public and the international media as a war on Islam. However, 9/11 conspiracy theorists claim that the US government used the 9/11 attacks to gain power over the Middle East and the American people. More precisely, the 9/11 conspiracy theory holds that Osama Bin Laden was never a real enemy of the US (Sáfrány, 2013).

If the tragedy of 9/11 made the intensity of anti-Islam feelings in the Western world increase, the Islamic world responded in various ways. The condemnation of the events of 9/11 is common in the Islamic world, but it is conditional. The Arab public reaction condemned the attack as a criminal act, although there were also those, who were satisfied that the US was finally feeling the pain of the Arab world and some other poor countries (Rabasa et al., 2004). The existence of Western media claims that the wrong party is Arab, or Muslim is also rejected by the Arab public. Conspiracy theories then emerged in the Arab world (Nasira, 2008). Most of these theories attempt to explain that the attacks were the work of extremists or individuals, the US government itself, or Israeli intelligence services. Compared to the events of 9/11, the military operations in Iraq had a more significant effect on the Arab world. If the Arab countries view the events of 9/11 as an issue outside the region, the operation that brought down Saddam Hussein's regime they see as something that happened in the region.

The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 with a force of 90.000 soldiers (Webster, 2011) drew criticism from Arab Muslims. Moderate Islam in Arabia sees this policy as an application of a clash of civilizations, as well as an attempted form of the US colonial invasion of Iraq due to the oil factor (Hinnebusch, 2007). Meanwhile, radical Arab Islamic groups have criticized the US invasion of Iraq as an attack on Muslims in the world. The anti-American protests grew bigger with mass media coverage, such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, which published many victims of violence and conflict and abused prisoners in Abu Ghraib. The Arab world increasingly views the US and the West supporting Israel, as exploitative, hypocritical, and likes to apply double standards, immoral, and aggressive (Asila, 2007).

In the context of the Southeast Asian region, the global war on terrorism has a greater impact than US military operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. From a regional point of view, the change in regional security issues was not caused by the events of 9/11, but rather due to the US leadership in the war against terrorism, which the government, political actors, and religious actors in the region responded to as a matter of closeness. As a result, the global war on terrorism brings two common losses in Southeast Asia. First, the focus of attention is on the relationship between al-Qaeda and local radical groups. This has in turn led to the establishment of unprecedented opportunities for cooperation between the West and countries in Southeast Asia, particularly in the military and intelligence fields. Second, Southeast Asia is considered a

transit area for terrorism networks, so it becomes the second front in the war against terrorism (Rabasa et al., 2004). The term second front affects the level of terrorist threat in Southeast Asia that comes from radical Islamic factions and war militias as well as access to terrorist group operations in border areas that are less supervised by the local government.

The main issue of the US in the global war on terrorism is not only members of terrorist groups, but rather how to adjust to eradicating militant Islamic movements and strengthening friendly governments and moderate groups in the Islamic world (Rabasa et al., 2004). For the West, moderate Muslims are the most effective potential alliance because they embrace traditions based on modern societal values such as democracy and pluralism. In countering terrorism, the strategy used by the Western world cannot be separated from the promotion of democracy as experienced during the Cold War. Commitment to democracy and political legitimacy stemming from the will of the people through democratic elections are key issues identified by Muslim moderates. Rabasa et al., (2007) detail moderate Muslims in four characteristics, namely: democracy, acceptance of non-sectarian sources of law, respect for the rights of women and minorities, and opposition to terrorism and acts of violence.

Western countries realize that moderate Islamic networks lack the financial resources and organizational capacity to build their own networks. This condition is in contrast to Islamic groups which are relatively small but have strong resources and extensive networks. Radical groups have mostly obtained funding from Saudi Arabia. These funds are an extension of Saudi Arabia's export of Islamic Wahhabism which, intentionally or not, has had an impact on the growth of religious extremism across the Muslim world (Sheikh, 2003). The Saudi Al-Haramain Foundation was one of the institutions that were closed because it was proven to have funded a number of terrorist organizations from Bosnia to Southeast Asia (Rabasa et al., 2007).

One of the concerns of the West in Southeast Asia lies in efforts to build moderate Islamic networks to counter-terrorism networks. Regionally, the attention of the US and the West is in Indonesia, which is considered a pillar of security in Southeast Asia (Kay, 2005). Indonesia itself, 2010 formed the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) to strengthen the government's efforts in countering terrorism, even Abdillah (2018) said the government

involved religious leaders and ulama in implementing its programs, especially in the form of Deradicalization and counterradicalism.

The Western world views Indonesia as having a significant role both inside and outside the region. This is based on Indonesia's actions and participation in the international world. Several things can be stated, namely: as one of the Pioneers of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The NAM emerged in the context of the decolonization wave after World War II (Keethaponcalan, 2016). At the Bandung Conference (Asia-Africa Conference) in 1955, participants, many of whom had recently become independent from their countries, called for "abstaining from the use of collective defense arrangements to serve the particular interests of any major powers." In the context of the Cold War, they argued, the countries of the developing world should not be allied with one of the two superpowers (the US and the Soviet Union) and should instead join to support self-determination against all forms of colonialism and imperialism (Desai & Heller, 2019). The Non-Aligned Movement contains several principles, including mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression agreements, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, equality and mutual benefit, and maintaining peace.

Indonesia was also one of the founders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which was represented by the Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Adam Malik (Mun, 2017). In general, Indonesia takes part in several matters related to ASEAN, namely: one of the five founding countries of ASEAN, the ASEAN Secretariat is in Indonesia, the organizer of the first ASEAN Summit held in Bali on 23-24 February 1976, initiating the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and the Declaration Zone of Peace, Free and Neutral (Anwar, 1997; Artner, 2017).

Indonesia's role can also be seen when it becomes a member of the OIC. Indeed, Indonesia's dynamics within the OIC are unique and experience ups and downs. The role of Indonesia's membership has been since the OIC was established on September 25, 1969, because Indonesia was one of 24 countries that attended the 1st High-Level Conference in Rabat, Kingdom of Morocco. Initially, Indonesia's role and membership in the OIC were still limited and sparked debate, both from within the OIC and in Indonesia itself. When the first charter of the OIC was drafted in 1972, Indonesia refused to sign and refrained from becoming an official member because according to

the 1945 Constitution, it was stated that Indonesia was not an Islamic state, even with an Indonesian foreign policy that was free and active, not based on Islamic values (Ghafur, 2011). However, due to the demands of domestic aspirations and politics, Indonesia began to play a role in the membership of the OIC when President Suharto attended the 6th OIC High-Level Conference in 1991 in Senegal (Towadi & Supriyanto, 2020). This is the first step in changing Indonesia's foreign policy to participate more actively in the OIC, although its role is not as dominant as in the ASEAN forum and the Non-Aligned Movement.

Indonesia's active role in the OIC was prominent when it received a mandate as chairman of the Committee of Six in 1993, which was tasked with facilitating peace negotiations between the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Philippine government (Flores, 2019). Then in 1996, Indonesia hosted the 24th OIC Ministerial Conference in Jakarta. In addition, Indonesia has also contributed to reforming the OIC as a forum to answer the challenges of Muslims entering the 21st century. At the 14th OIC High-Level Conference in Dakar, Senegal, Indonesia supported the implementation of OIC's Ten-Year Plan of Action. With the adoption of this charter, Indonesia has room to play a greater role in ensuring the implementation of OIC reforms in the form of a commitment to guarantee freedom, tolerance, and harmonization as well as providing concrete evidence of the harmony of Islam, democracy, and modernity. The OIC for Indonesia is a means to show the image of moderate Islam, friendly and polite. Indonesia demonstrated to the international community the implementation of the 1998 reforms, as well as Indonesia's ability to pass the transition to a democratic state through the 2004 general election, which was directly elected by the Indonesian people.

MODERATE ISLAMIC IDENTITY AS A MEDIATOR BETWEEN THE WEST AND ISLAM

The ongoing struggle in most of the world, including the Muslim world is essentially a war of ideas. In relation to efforts to build a moderate Islamic network by the West, Indonesia welcomes this positively, which can be seen in the annual presentation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January 2004. The former Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs (2001-2009), N. H. Wirajuda revealed that as a country with the largest Muslim population in the world, Indonesia bears the obligation to project the true face of Islam (moderate Islam) (Ridho, 2004). Through the image of moderate Islam,

Indonesia tries to distance itself from the radical impression labeled Islam after the 9/11 attacks. This image is also an attempt by Indonesia to clarify the misunderstanding of the Western view which claims that democratic failures tend to occur in Muslim-populated countries. Although the population is Muslim, Indonesia is not an Islamic country. Even, the rapid growth of political parties based on Islam after independence and the Reformation did not show any indication of notification of an Islamic state. As an implication, Indonesia's foreign policy does not have an Islamic character, in order to maintain a non-theocratic identity and reject exclusive causal factors (Sukma, 2008).

In the context of this study, the author sees democracy and moderate Islam as part of Indonesia's efforts as a democratic country to get closer to developed democracies such as Western countries. If we look at studies on the implementation of foreign policy in new democracies, for example, Stanger (1995) finds that the democratic process can run, and its democratic direction can be maintained when the new democracy brings itself closer to an established democracy. To explain this phenomenon, Vermonte (2005) put forward two reasons. First, foreign policy can be used as a tool to distance or differentiate oneself from the governing regime. Second, as a consequence of the first reason, the prospects for international cooperation, especially with countries with established democracies will improve, and in the end, will make a positive contribution to the internal consolidation process.

It should be remembered that the Indonesian economy received a lot of pressure after the terror bombings in this country in October 2002. Indonesia's exports decreased as well as increased credit risk, leaving no opportunities for foreign or domestic parties. Another thing to note is the travel warning issued by a number of embassies such as the US, Australia, and several Western European countries for their citizens traveling to Indonesia. As a result, it has a negative impact on the tourism sector. The magnitude of the economic loss due to the terror bombing driven by radical Islamic movements is one of the reasons for Indonesia to portray its Islamic moderation. More specifically, in relations with Western countries, this cooperation is aimed at establishing continuous cooperation so that the process is carried out in a dialogical manner through diplomacy. Director of Information and Media at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, P. L. E. Priatna revealed that moderate Islam is only part of the image of spreading democracy that is driven through diplomacy. It should be

noted that foreign policy has a different meaning from diplomacy. Foreign policy is concerned with the substance and content of foreign relations, while diplomacy is more focused on the methodology for implementing foreign policy (Suryokusumo, 2004).

Generally, the diplomatic route used by Indonesia in portraying moderate Islam is in the form of intensive dialogues such as dialogue between beliefs, cultures, and civilizations (Idris, Willya, Wekke, & Mokodenseho, 2020). According to Abdillah (2011), these three types of dialogue should bring out the similarities between the various religions, cultures, and civilizations. Abdillah (2011) added that in the context of Islam, dialogue is especially useful because it can eliminate negative images among non-Muslims, especially in the West who view Islam as an anti-peace religion. This kind of dialogue has been carried out by Indonesia in national and international forums. This kind of dialogue has been carried out by Indonesia in national and international forums, both bilaterally, regionally, and multilaterally. For example, the bilateral dialogue between Indonesia and Italy at the conference: "Unity in Diversity: The Culture of Coexistence in Indonesia". Throughout 2008, Indonesia has conducted an interfaith dialogue with the UK, Austria, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Canada, Lebanon, and Australia. Meanwhile, in the regional and multilateral framework, similar dialogues can be found in the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) since 2005. Specifically for the Asia-Pacific region, the Asia-Pacific conference on interfaith dialogue and cooperation was also initiated in 2004, taking place in Yogyakarta (Rakhmawati, 2010).

Indonesia's effort to represent democracy and moderate Islam is by implementing the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF) (Grzywacz, 2020; Grzywacz, 2020a). The forum, which was initiated by Indonesia in 2008 in Bali, was attended by representatives from countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The BDF aims to foster democracy, human rights, equality, and mutual respect. In practice, the BDF has encouraged countries to strike a balance between economic and political development; creating peace and security; promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms; and respecting human values (Rosyidin, 2020). All of them are reflected in the three founding pillars of the United Nations (UN) Charter. Since its establishment, there have been more than 50 countries (Halans & Nassy, 2013) participating in the BDF, and it continued to grow in 2019 with 57 countries participating as participants and 73 countries and 10 international organizations as observers

(Madu, 2021). Unlike the BDF in previous years, in 2020 because Indonesia was hit by COVID-19, this BDF was attended directly by 44 people from 26 countries and 3 international organizations, as well as more than 1000 people virtually (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Republic of Indonesia, 2020).

Indonesia's participation and contributions in international forums ultimately raise the spirit of interaction and build intensive communication between Indonesia and other countries in the world. It is undeniable that Western democracies recognize the credibility of Indonesian Islam as a religion that can coexist with democracy, and there is hope from them for Indonesia to play a role as the voice of world Islam to mediate between the West and Islam (Kay, 2005). Thus, Indonesia, as the largest Muslim country in the world, can become a model for Islamic civilization, as it demonstrates a proper and harmonious partnership between Islam and democracy.

Indonesia reads what the international community wants as an opportunity to take part and be actively involved on the international stage. In this way, Indonesia has a strong reason to portray a moderate Islamic identity. Indonesia's image of moderate Islamic identity is closely related to its perspective on seeing the world and building partners (Idris et al., 2021; Wekke & Mokodenseho, 2017). Indonesia's national perspective on the world is a perspective that is always present from the nature of the world system, and at the same time takes its place in the world system (Mokodenseho & Zamhari, 2021). To borrow Tan's (2007) opinion, although Indonesia has drastically changed its leadership structure, the consistency of its perspective in viewing the world system is evident from the country's contemporary history. It can be seen from the beginning until now, that Indonesia's attention has never been separated from its interest in the international community. Efforts to increase Indonesia's role in foreign relations, as stated in the Long-Term Development Vision and Direction (PJP) 2005–2025, that this can be done by formulating priorities for strengthening the capacity and credibility of foreign policy in order to participate in creating world peace and justice in international relations; formulating priorities for improving the quality of diplomacy in international forums in an effort to maintain national security, territorial integrity, and safeguard the wealth of national natural resources; to streamline and expand the function of cooperation networks in order to rebuild ASEAN solidarity in the fields of politics, culture, and security towards the formation of a more solid ASEAN community; and encouraging and maintaining world peace through efforts to increase political and cultural

mutual understanding, both between countries and between peoples in the world (Republic of Indonesia, 2007).

MODERATE ISLAMIC IDENTITY: ALTERNATIVE MODELS FOR THE ISLAMIC WORLD

The role that Indonesia wants to achieve through the image of a moderate Islamic identity undergoes a metamorphosis when faced with political upheaval in the Middle East and North Africa, which are predominantly Muslim. The demands for political change in the region have inspired Indonesia to play the role of a moderate Islamic model. In fact, political changes in the Middle East and North Africa began when demonstrators in Tunisia succeeded in overthrowing the regime of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali (President of Tunisia 1987–2011) (Schraeder & Redissi, 2011), followed by the resignation of Mohammad Hosni Said Mubarak (President of Egypt 1981–2011) (Abdo-Katsipis, 2019), and the death of Muammar Gaddafi (President of Libya 1969–2011). The chain reaction of actions that took place in Egypt and Tunisia quickly spread to Algeria, Libya, Jordan, Lebanon, Yemen, Syria (Norris, 2013), and neighboring regions. Protests, strikes, and large demonstrations have taken place across the region, destabilizing the government.

Various aspects occurred in the Middle East and North Africa, both of which have many similarities with Indonesia during the 1998 Reformation era. From a socio-cultural perspective, Indonesia is home to the world's largest Muslim population, as well as the Middle East and North Africa. From the phenomenological aspect, Indonesia and the Middle East/North Africa have similarities. One of the triggers is an exogenous factor, namely a crisis that causes a chain reaction of young people as protestors who are disappointed with development policies and economic growth in a country. Meanwhile, the public policy instrument is used by the government to invite the public to rely on the internet network. In addition, the government's response to the protests was not far from a response that was accompanied by acts of violence that led to arrests and killings.

Referring to the explanation above, there are parallel experiences between the Middle East and North Africa region and Indonesia. Indonesia, which feels that it has experienced this, shows a desire to share experiences in order to become a model for the Islamic world, especially the Arabian Peninsula. In an interview on CNN on June 15, 2011, President Yudhoyono

stated that Indonesia can be a model where Islam and democracy can go hand in hand and there is no contradiction in between. Furthermore, Yudhoyono explained that if Indonesia can hold a democracy while respecting Islamic values at the same time, other Middle Eastern countries can also do the same. To become an alternative model for the Middle East and North Africa, Indonesia's foreign policy must be applied carefully as a form of Indonesia's consistency on the principle of non-intervention. Indonesia is of the view that the achievement of people's aspirations must grow internally (home grow), pay attention to the cultural uniqueness of the region, and not be forced by external actors. It is hoped that this can be used to resolve the socio-political turmoil that has occurred in the Middle East and North Africa. The sharing experience process carried out by Indonesia can be found at the BDF IV, which was attended by Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Yemen, or the Institute for Peace and Democracy (IPD) through the Workshop on Egypt-Indonesia Dialogue on Democratic Transition program (2011).

Political changes in the Middle East and North Africa provide opportunities for Indonesia to forge a more harmonious relationship with the Islamic world. The main issue in Indonesia's foreign policy in the Islamic crisis is how to formulate and implement an Islamic foreign policy. However, it is more about the need to improve relations with Muslim countries and pay attention to issues in the Islamic world, as well as take meaningful initiatives on these issues. Thus, Indonesia, which has a Muslim majority even though it is on the outskirts of the Islamic world, can play an important role in the Islamic world.

Along with expectations for harmonious relations between Indonesia and the Middle East, there is also a hope that these relations can provide economic benefits for Indonesia. This hope is since although the trade between the two has not shown a decline, Indonesia's economic relations with the Middle East have not yet reached the expected stage. Indonesia's trade value with the Middle East is still far below the value of Indonesia's trade with the US or Indonesia's trade with Europe. In fact, the Middle East has an average growth of about 11% per year. As one of Indonesia's main trading partners, investment in the Middle East and North Africa is relatively minimal. Compared to Japanese and South Korean investments, Indonesia is still not one of the main investment destinations for Middle Eastern countries. In fact, the investment potential of the Middle East is significant, especially in

Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, which are part of the three major countries with the highest GDP value in the world, according to the World Bank. Thus, humanitarian, and economic factors are considered in Indonesia's relations with Muslim countries in the world. Meanwhile, the role of religious ties is not so dominant in the context of Indonesia's foreign policy.

CONCLUSION

The discussion related to Indonesia's foreign policy in carrying out a moderate Islamic identity found two things, namely: first, the desire of the Indonesian government to achieve interests on the international stage. This desire is a form of consistency in Indonesia's perspective on the world, as well as being actively involved and taking part in the world peace agenda. The identity of moderate Islam is part of Indonesia's identity as a democratic country, although moderate Islam is only a complementary identity of Indonesia's democratic system. Second, the Western world has a desire to develop moderate Islamic networks as their partners, especially in countering terrorism networks in the world. This finding cannot be separated from the relevant principles shared by the Western world and moderate Muslims, who both uphold democracy and respect for human rights.

The findings above lead the author to several arguments regarding Indonesia taking part in promoting the identity of moderate Islam in its foreign policy. This is related to the consideration of internal and external interests. Internally, Indonesia wants to play a role in international relations, especially as a mediator between Islam and the West through dialogue between religions, cultures, and civilizations; Indonesia wants to identify itself differently from Muslim countries in the world as a form of anticipating or breaking the negative view of Muslims who are perceived by the West and the media as anti-Western, extremist, and intolerant, and to maintain good relations between Indonesia and Western countries; Indonesia through the power of the government bridges the aspirations of Indonesian Muslims who really want an improvement in Islamic relations as a whole. Meanwhile, externally, there is hope from the international community, especially the West, to get closer to Muslims. The author also believes that Western countries need the voice of Muslim countries in an effort to mediate and minimize problems related to human rights violations in various aspects of life.

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