

Rifan Khumaidi, Mukaffan, Mashur Imam

Trans-Paradigm of Ex-Khilafah Ideologists: Paradigm Changes Analysis of Ex-Khilafah Ideologists in Tapal Kuda

UIN KH Ahmad Shiddiq
UIN KH Ahmad Shiddiq
STAI Cendekia Insani
Email: sajakimam@gmail.com

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Abstract: *This research is based on the gap between the theory of religious conflict and the reality of the religious transition paradigm currently. Media issues have warmed up again lately with some news about the policy of disbanding radical mass organizations. After the dissolution of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) stumbled on administrative problems. After it was disbanded, the all members and cadres of the organizations chose to change their religious paradigm. The transition process is the main focus of this research. Based on the general framework of the shifting paradigm theory, the sub-focus consists of how to anomaly, the Critique process until form a new paradigm of ex- Khilafah ideologues. In order to further limit the study, the site raised is the former ideologue Khilafah of Tapal Kuda. All problems are studied qualitatively using a phenomenological approach. The important findings of this study can be divided into three parts. First, the anomaly of the ex- Khilafah ideologue. There are three forms of anomaly, namely socio-cultural anomaly, siyasa anomaly and tradition anomaly. Second, the Critique process of ex- Khilafah ideologues. Its scope are socio-cultural Critique and siyasa Critique. Third, his new paradigm. There are two patterns of paradigm for the former ideology of the Khilafah, namely there are those who continue to fight for the Khilafah and there are those who choose to continue their ideological struggle. The first group carried out the process of marhala tsaqif and taf'ul. This last group bases its religious views on the majority, namely the religious paradigm of NU and Pesantren.*

Keywords: *Ex-Khilafah; Paradigm; Critique; Conflict; Ideologue.*

INTRODUCTION

The ideology that unites state construction with Islam is always in endless conflict. In Indonesia, ideological disputes among Islamic *Ummah* have started since after achieving independence. C. Van Dijk noted that the conflict began with the idea of *Darul Islam*, a noble ideal that must be fought. Historically, this conception was born after independence, to mention a violent movement aiming to realize the ideal of upholding Islamic law as the central system of the state (Dijk, 1983). Ajid explained that several DI/TII Islamic mass organizations since 1949-1957 attempted subversives to fight for the fundamental Islam ideology in patriotic consciousness (U. Thohir, 2020). They opposed the idea of the nationalist group's desire to make Pancasila the Indonesian ideology. However, at the time of independence, they came together in a narrative of developing an integral national and religious identity. In the end, only NU and Muhammadiyah accepted the ideology of Pancasila as a means of national glue in Indonesia.

The word “*Khilafah*” is a hybrid term often juxtaposed with a particular model of a religious movement and living discourses taught to the public, especially Muslims. As an ideology, *Khilafah* is manifested in the form of resistance from Islamic groups to establish an Islamic state—this whole movement, which later grew as transnational Islamism. Conversely, as a discourse page, educational institutions, recitation forums, and other associations in the community become indoctrination teaching.

Indonesian history records that Islamic ideology as a struggle has emerged alongside efforts to gain independence from Dutch colonialism. The conception is that the Islamic movement, as part of the expression of "jihad," upholds the value of independence (*al Hurriyat*) as outlined in the history of Islam in the era of the prophet (Dijk, 1983). The form of this Islamic ideologue's struggle also varied at the time; there were Santri and Nahdlatul Ulama' (NU). There is also a narrative built by the Nationalist-Islamist group. Alternatively, transnational groups presently implement Islamist-Global ideology (Hilmy, 2011a).

Apart from the historical conception above, today, the reincarnation of Islamist ideologues has again surfaced, especially in the pages of national or local politics. Conceptually, M. Hawari divides this group into two visible organizational displays: HTI and FPI. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) displays the word *Khilafah* more as a living discourse in the public sphere. In contrast, FPI makes the *Khilafah* an ideology firmly held to be enforced through movement mechanism and wrapped almost the same as the classical ideologues of Islam in the early days of independence (Hawari, 2005; 206-209).

The reincarnation of Islamic ideologues in the form of these two organizational models then received "resistance" from the government. In 2017, HTI was deemed to threaten the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia. The ideology developed is considered contrary to the values in Pancasila. Muazaroh explained in detail that there were three paradigm for its dissolution, namely, in order to maintain the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia, prevent radicalism, and the state is in a precarious condition (Muazaroh, 2019). Likewise with FPI, in 2020, FPI was also disbanded. Although it is said that its Grand

Imam, Habib Rizieq Shihab, holds the responsibility of Pancasila, it was still disbanded. The fundamental paradigm was that FPI was also proven to be trying to undermine the power of the government. This paradigm is discussed in detail in a research report by Mark Woodward et al. Their conclusion explains that FPI tries to fight the legitimate government and take public legal consensus that is not in line with Shara's teachings (Woodward dkk., 2012).

Although it has been dissolved, it does not mean that the ideology of "*Khilafah*" in two different forms has disappeared from public discourse circulation. After the dissolution of HTI-FPI, researchers observed that there was a phenomenon in several areas of East Java's Horseshoe; for example, several recitation communities still seemed to continue to strengthen political teachings that combined the spirit of the holiday with *Khilafah Islamiyah* fundamentally.

As an initial finding, when HTI was dissolved in 2017 because it was indicated to carry out the Islamic *Khilafah* movement, there were still several Muslim groups in Tapal Kuda, a region located in the eastern part of East Java that includes seven regencies; Banyuwangi, Bondowoso, Jember, Lumajang, Pasuruan, Situbondo and Probolinggo, of who continued to aggressively develop a discourse of defense for the dissolution of this organization, which was considered radical. Some Islamic boarding schools have been part of the Nahdliyah group since the beginning, which also defends the understanding of khilafat Islamiyah. They aspire and hope the state is based on Islamic law, Kaffah. This fact was found in several pesantren in Jember Regency. Based on the search conducted, there are three pesantrens located in three different regions, which often voice the importance of upholding Islamic law as the main foundation of the state. The three pesantren are Bahrul Ulum Pesantren (Media, 2019b) in Tanggul Jember village, Al Fattah Pesantren in Mumbulsari village and Nurul Ulum Pesantren Ajung Jember (Media, 2019a). The facts of the three pesantren are enough to provide evidence of a shift in the thinking of Pesantren's Kiai to the ideology of the *Khilafah*. This event happened after the group known as its proponent was disbanded.

This reality is one side of the evidence of the shift in religious paradigm after the dissolution of the two mass organizations. In addition to causing a shift in paradigm from the religious paradigm of the community in general, the most that also occurred after the dissolution was the transition of the paradigm of the *ex-Khilafah* ideologues to the paradigm commonly owned by the Nahdliyah group, namely anti-*Khilafah*. This situation happened because of the awareness of understanding that was believed to have been misled by the state. One example of the reality that occurs in several regions is that several people have entered NU membership. In Probolinggo, several NU stakeholders publicly announced that they accepted former members of HTI and FPI (Indonesia, 2021).

So, there has been a transition due to the developed political conditions and situations. What is essential to be questioned in such a reality is certainly the process of shifting paradigms of religion. In this context, it is essential to read it with Khun's paradigm shift theory approach. Conceptually, Khun's theory describes several stages of switching paradigm as happens in all existing paradigm processes. In its stages, it is explained that

before the formation of a new paradigm, an anomalous process occurs in the old reason, so Critique is needed to overcome it. About the reality that occurs, it is certain that some people in the political conditions above experience the process of paradigm transition, as Khun describes.

The whole study is expected to be useful theoretically and praxis. Theoretically, the study's findings have significance in developing the paradigm shift model that Khun has initiated. This study seeks to develop paradigm changes in the context of religious ideology transition. Practically, this research can be used as a basis for policymakers and the government to cope with and facilitate former members of HTI and FPI after the dissolution.

RESEARCH METHOD

The method used to examine the transpolar issues that occur in the former horseshoe *Khilafah* ideology is carried out using a qualitative approach. The qualitative approach used is by combining two approaches, namely psycho-sociological. This approach is an effort to seek an understanding of the frame of mind (mindset) and views in terms of the *Khilafah* and the praxis of the actions of former ideologues. Therefore, this approach emphasizes efforts to manage meaningfulness philosophically and theoretically and achieve objectivity of meaning and value contained in the research object. Such an approach is used in research preparation, data condensation, data collection, data display, and conclusion drawing and verification (Miles dkk., 2014). Several processes of such an approach are expected to holistically describe the discourse of the *Khilafah* paradigm or reasoning after the political ban.

The data collection process is carried out in various ways; first, including documentation. This method is used to study changes in the form of essential texts and is related to changes in the paradigm of *ex-Khilafah* ideology that occurred. In addition, this method will significantly play a role in interpreting the changes in the nascent paradigm process in action—second, in-depth interviews. Invite informants to reflect on interpretations of their experiences. This method is needed to get more in-depth information and the possibility of reading someone's facial expressions to avoid the possibility of lies. Third, Observation is an activity related to the portrait of actions or indications shown in the process of changes that occur in paradigm. This third point ensures changes in paradigm after the prohibition of the *Khilafah* paradigm they have.

As for the data analysis method, it is needed to theoretically construct and systematize the results of research in the field on the paradigm transition of the former *Khilafah* ideology: first, discourse analysis analyzes and reflects on all changes in views and thoughts conveyed by the former *Khilafah* ideologues studied. As explained by Dijk, discourse analysis seeks to observe social changes (T. A. van Dijk, 1997). Second, the results of theoretical construction were developed with *verstehen* analysis. That is, the process of analysis at the symbolic analysis stage captures the content of thought and interpretation, captures the meaning of concepts, and describes systematically. Third,

Heurmeantik interprets, reveals, and analyzes all essential-substantial meanings in every phenomenon (Giddens, 1982). The hermeneutic method is essential in this research because it wants to reveal and analyze all the essential meanings in the context. Deduction and Induction Methods are applied in the research after the data has been collected and analyzed, and conclusions are made based on the data. This inference does not formulate a generalization but realizes a theoretical construction.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Anomalous Paradigm of *Ex-Khilafah* Ideologues

Organizations with different religions, in general, will experience difficulties in conducting social interactions. The reason, of course, is the difference in religious perceptions and rituals. Moreover, perceptions, values, and even traditions have become consensus. Slight differences in the existing consensus will be easily identified. Those who are identified will usually be separated from the ongoing culture.

This argumentation is also the case with the *Khilafah* ideologues—those who get doctrine from their organization and are easily read by the public. Identifying differences in religious perceptions and values is easy because it can take the form of actions and traditions that appear different from what has been solid or organized as a common thing in the previous community culture. Moh. Rosyid explained that identifying differences in religious rituals is the most underlying thing that weakens social harmonization (Rosyid, 2017). Didik Kusno Aji added that it becomes vulnerable because each group and person with different perceptions does not want to reach a consensus with the agreed understanding (Aji, 2017). Hermawati, Caroline, et al. explain that religious perception fundamentalism has a level opposite to tolerance. 'Tolerance increases groups' and individuals' subjective levels of religious fundamentalism (Hermawati dkk., 2017).

Some explanations are enough to provide insight; the first anomaly that occurs in the *trans-paradigm* process of the former *Khilafah* ideology is on the side of their separation from the existing social consensus. This condition throws them out of the majority group and immediately puts them in the position of social public minority. Rizqiyah, an ex-HTI member in Situbondo, has been facing this condition; she felt a difference and separated herself from the social consensus when she joined her former organization. In the data found above, when she was a member of HTI, she often disagreed with her father and mother. Some of her family looked cynical, and she was even told that she was called by his teacher to stop studying, which caused her to be different from others in general.

The most striking difference is in understanding the religious dress culture that has become a tradition in Situbondo itself. For her, women must keep their genitals covered, so she chooses to wear a robe. This behavior makes her marginalized and easy to read. She chooses to wear it no longer to cover her aurat but to symbolize the clothing of a particular mass organization. The community suspects that something is not right with his religious understanding. At this point, he feels a form of anomaly.

Besides the above incident, Chairul Anam also felt it. In his story, he felt the anomaly of his social disconnection because he was affiliated with FPI. This incident, which he felt, shows the disconnection of social interaction due to actions not based on values that have become a consensus of community harmony. Rosalina Ginting and Aryaningrum state that tolerance values are a consensus that should not be stepped over in building a harmonious, homogeneous social life (Ginting & Aryaningrum, 2009). This value in the anomaly of former FPI members is at odds with the spirit and movement of the organization.

Several researchers provided explanations related to the anomalies felt by former ideologues. There is an explanation that tolerance should not only be understood as a harmonious value in groups of different religions. However, it can also address differences in internal religious teachings. In the case of the anomaly felt by Anam, of course, it is the weakness of religious tolerance that occurs between and within religions themselves. Clark, Powel, and Julian explain this side. Their book explains that tolerance that is not held between internal religious *Ummah* will weaken social harmonization. Most former FPIs feel this condition. Those who sometimes indiscriminately conduct sweeping based on religion sometimes receive ridicule from their social public.

Second, *Siyasah* or political anomalies. This anomaly is more in the form of national awareness, which is also generally related to the perception of religious teachings. The awareness of upholding the Islamic *Khilafah* as an instrument to ensure the establishment of Islamic shari'a is an awareness that hits the inevitability of Indonesia's anthropological conditions. Indonesia, which has many tribes and religious beliefs, makes it impossible for the Islamic *Khilafah* system to be implemented. If it is forced to be implemented, it will be able to eliminate national justice, and of course, it could divorce Indonesia. This anomaly is what puts the former *Khilafah* ideology in a dilemma. On the one hand, they cannot reject the inevitability of the nation's heterogeneity. On the other hand, they also realize that they must fight to establish Shara' in Indonesia..

This second anomaly relates to the conflict between the *Khilafah* enforcement group and the Indonesian government, as Hasby Azwar et al. explained in their research that a gap occurs in state politics between HTI and the government. It is a political conflict because they also mobilize forces to reject the Indonesian government. For them, the enforcement of the *Khilafah* must be pursued optimally without bargaining. The Indonesian government indeed refuses because it realizes the heterogeneity of the Indonesian nation (Azwar, 2018).

The political dilemma of upholding the *Khilafah* makes HTI members experience anomalies. On the one hand, they understand the obligation to uphold the *Khilafah*. On the other hand, they also understand that the conception of upholding the *Khilafah* tends to vary in each case. As stated in the theoretical study, the paradigm of the *Khilafah* continues to change. This changing paradigm is likely also based on the anomalies between the understanding of religious *Siyasah* and the political conditions at that time. So, the *Khilafah*'s paradigm tends to be debated in every era (Aziz, 2019).

Hal demikian yang membuat beberapa eks Ideolog *Khilafah* banyak mengaku mengalami kebingungan dalam memahami hubungan agama dan negara. Anomali dan

kebingungan ini tentu sama dengan apa yang dijelaskan oleh beberapa peneliti. Di antaranya, Amsori dan Ermawati yang mengatakan bahwa dilematik konsep *Khilafah* terjadi karena banyak gerakan politik sepanjang sejarah. Abbasiyah, kholafaur rosyidin dan semacamnya berbeda-beda dalam prakteknya (Amsori & Ernawati, 2020).

Azmeh goes deeper to talk about his form of misconception. According to him, the actual confusion relates to his political leadership. He details the ulama'-ulama's different incomes when choosing a leader. Some require Quraysh, some only suggest Arabs, and some do not even suggest these important descendants (Azmeh, 2016). Considerations certainly make an anomaly in the former *Khilafah* ideologues, especially HTI. They need a clear conception of the building state, *Siyasah*. Aziz discusses the condition as one of the paradigms for the controversy of HTI's political understanding that cannot be denied (Aziz, 2019;54).

So, in essence, the second form of anomaly relates to the suitability and dilemma of the *Khilafah* to be championed. The *Khilafah* is considered incompatible with the heterogeneous Indonesian nation. The implementation of an Islamic state system would discriminate against non-Muslim Indonesians. In addition, the Islamic *Khilafah* is also not yet a standardized conception. Historically, the practice of the Islamic *Khilafah* varies. There are still many debates among Muslim leaders and even among scholars. This whole discourse certainly makes the former *Khilafah* ideology confused and makes them doubtful of accepting and fighting for the *Khilafah* as their organization used to be.

Besides misconceptions, a connection to the organization's extreme aversion to modernity exists. For them, in the past, when they joined the strangest religious organizations, anything that came from the West was considered wrong. Modernity is one of the styles considered incompatible with the concept of Islamic *Siyasah*. Masdar Hilmy explained that one of the paradigms for HTI's version of the *Khilafah* concept is that it opposes democracy. His behavior is very aggressive in socializing anti-democracy. This opposition certainly violates political rationality (Hilmy, 2011b). Unsurprisingly, after being dissolved, they (the former *Khilafah* ideologues) experienced anomalies in the form of the incompatibility of their *Siyasah* system with modern politics.


Third, the anomaly of religious tradition. In this aspect, it relates to anomalies in religious paradigm in the *fiqh* of worship (*ubudiyah*). It is a finding that *ex-Khilafah* ideologues have few striking differences in the issue of religious paradigm. Because, indeed, some of the studies conducted by the organization do not discuss much *fiqh*. They do not conflict and argue much in terms of *Fiqhiyah*. Even in the Islamic Draft Law. In the sense that former *Khilafah* ideologues do not question about religious paradigm too much. Nevertheless, some things generally remain at odds with religious traditions in general.

The data obtained, are two things related to the tradition of religious worship: pluralistic *fiqh* and dislike for traditions considered to be sourced from human rationality. For the first, it is explained that it shows that *ex-Khilafah* ideologues do not have specific references in worship. Likewise, in the issue of *Mazhab* in the field of *fiqh*, if we borrow the language of Fadh Ahmad Arifan, in an extensive matter, they use books from various madhhabs to find the most potent argument (*Tarjih*). It is just that unlike NU's *Babtsul*

Masa'il, which does not use the works of certain scholars such as Ibn Taymiyyah, Yusuf Qardhawi, Said Hawwa, Nashiruddin Al-Albani and several other figures who are considered conservative. Nevertheless, even so, they are sensitive to what is forbidden by Shara', especially those from the West (Arifan, 2011).

For more details, based on the long explanation above, the researcher tries to frame the conception of the anomaly as the following description:

Anomalous Shape of *Ex-Khilafah* Ideologists



The facts related to this traditional anomaly are evident in the case that happened to Rizqiyah. She admits that several traditions make her uneasy. One of them is the opposition of some teachers at HTI Situbondo, who criticize the tradition of *Sholawat* together, which is common in the community. According to him, the *Sholawat* recited at that time was not appropriate. The correct *Sholawat* needs to be read as it happens in society. This reciting certainly confused him because the *Sholawat* tradition in Situbondo has been running for a long time. Well-known religious figures and caretakers of large Islamic boarding schools even led it. This condition made him wonder. He became doubtful and felt like he was losing his grip. Because, if *Sholawat*, it means that the kiai's teaching is wrong. In his mind, the kiai could not be wrong at that time. However, it is also impossible that the teachers in his organization are also wrong. This phenomenon is what researchers identify as an anomaly of tradition

Based on the explanation above, three forms of anomalies occur in *ex-Khilafah* ideologues: First, Socio-cultural anomalies occur due to the gap in previous socio-cultural perceptions and values. Second, the *Siyasah* anomaly consists of two things: the wrong conception of the *Khilafah* and its compatibility with the actions of modern society. Third, the anomaly of tradition is also related to differences in cultural values. It is more specific to the attitude towards local traditions and pesantren taught by the previous kiai who have been strong.

Critique Paradigm Process of *Ex-Khilafah* Ideologues

Several forms of criticism are carried out by *ex-Khilafah* ideologues, namely, anti-thesis or criticism of social norms of society. Such discourse is related to public rules as norms in society. Theoretically, norms are always explained based on the consensus of several objective societies. Such consensus occurs because society has reached an excellent moral agreement. The agreement is undoubtedly related to the perceptions and values that bind the reality of community action. As Mahon, Cowan, and McCarthy stated, norms are formed from subjective perceptions and then bind and become societal controls (Mahon dkk., 2006).

The norms of the Tapal Kuda community change based on community consensus on the reflection of reality and rational religious perceptions. So, even though the community firmly holds religious teachings in matters of morality or public law, they tend to agree on the results of joint deliberations between communities. Such normative reasoning is grounded following the development of the cultural *fiqh* paradigm of *Abli Sunnah Wal Jama'ah*. As we all understand, the majority of pesantren teach rational reasoning. Hasnan Bachtiar explains that the Sunni ulama, most developed in Indonesia, has determined rules based on *Maqhsidus Shari'ah* for the common good (Bachtiar, 2011). Rusfi explained that such reasoning makes the Sunni community, in its public legitimacy, always try to implement moral idealism in the problems that occur (Rusfi, 2014). This idealism also exists in the beliefs of the Indonesian people, especially the Muslims of the Horseshoe. They have a pesantren culture that agrees on the rational formulation of norms for the *Maslahah Ummat*.

It is different with *ex-Khilafah* ideologues. Societal norms for them should be sourced from Islamic teachings. They dislike social rules made formally by society or the government. For them, nothing can be trusted as a norm or rule in society other than what has been explained in the Qur'an or by the law from an Islamic perspective. They call rules other than those derived from Islamic teachings or shari'at something deviant. They term it as *toghut*.

The narration of *toghut* as a public consensus has been developing for a long time, not only in Islam. In the thought of Thomas Aquinas, for example, laws should not be made by humans. Humans are considered not to have the capacity to find the ultimate truth. So, there are no social norms and laws that humans can compile. All rules are from God. Human law is limited; God's law is eternal (*ex parte dei*) (Copleston, 2021). This law is in line with what *ex-Khilafah* ideologues believe. They generally do not believe in any norms that come from humans and include tolerance values in existing cultures.

Two types of criticism launched at the reality occur and criticism imposed on the organization's own group. The criticism that is based on the organization itself is the belief in God, who is all-righteous and does not at all provide opportunities for humans to do *ijtihad*. This paradigm is mainly carried out by *ex-Khilafah* ideologues disappointed in the

broad social reality and the government. The content of this group's criticism remains based on the general knowledge of the organization.

Those types of criticism above contrast the criticism directed at the organizational group. Most of this group are former ideologues dissatisfied and worried about their religious understanding and beliefs; those who join this group realize that things must be corrected in their actions and organizational duties because the majority do not follow them. The content of this group's criticism usually contains an awareness of the benefits and tolerance between religious *Ummah*. Of course, the believed narrative is the content of the Sunnah expert's paradigm as a social *Manhaj*. In their efforts, they tend to realize and blame their previous beliefs.

Depends on the process of *Siyasah* criticism, there are also opposing types of critical content. Some respond with anti-democracy and thought narratives, and those build criticism of the rationality of the state. As stated at the beginning, HTI did not believe in any policies made by humans. In this case, it includes the state. Criticism of this content is still used after the former ideologue dissolves. The criticism, in the findings presented, contains the economic crisis and criticism of the hegemony of capitalism. There are many explanations related to this in the explanation of the documentation found. In essence, Indonesia is considered to use the concept of capitalism and cannot escape from the hegemony cage.


Regarding the content of criticism, many have researched it, such as Syaiful Arif, who explains that as a transnational Islamic movement, HTI has a refined view of the basis of the Republic of Indonesia, namely Pancasila. In 1990, it explicitly disbelieved Pancasila because it contained a plurality of religions and ideologies, whereas only Islam was the correct religion and ideology. In 2012, HTI softened its views by calling Pancasila a philosophies set, a series of manufactured philosophies. Unfortunately, as a manufactured philosophy, Pancasila's status remains below Islam, which is understood as a divine ideology. The desire to uphold sharia and *Khilafah* is based on the existence of the precept of belief in One God in Pancasila. Thus, it is the right of Muslims. This belief contradicts HTI's view, which accepts Pancasila but places it under its ideological political building, *Khilafah* Islamiyah (Arif, 2016).

Masdar Hilmy explains the consequences of believing in human weakness in compiling legal consensus, causing *ex-Khilafah* ideologues to distrust the government and the state. Although there is a narrative that the *Khilafah* ideologues are also nationalists, this cannot be proven. *Khilafah* Islamiyah only trusts the government formed based on religion. If Indonesia is referred to as not weak, geographical brotherhood is inferior to religious brotherhood (Hilmy, 2011b).

The narration of criticism differs from the group that targets its organization. This group is more aware that Islam as *Rahmatal lil 'alamin* can only be used as a state system in the form of values. The paradigm developed is national rationality. One of them, for example, is the development of integrated thinking between nationalism and the nation's life. Legal consensus is wrong for him if it is only based on religious texts. However, it also needs to be determined based on the benefit of the *Ummah*. Of course, many of these

criticisms were directed at his organization, which had been disbanded. Some of the above explanations the author tries to describe as follows:

Critique Concept of *Khilafah* Ideology



The criticism developed by this second group is based more on considerations of the inevitability of Indonesia's heterogeneity and the teachings of previous Indonesian ulama'. One of them is, as stated by Iwan Setiawan. In his view, Indonesian ulama' are very rational in their religion. After looking at the history of the two founding figures of Islamic education and national heroes, he put forward this opinion. They are Ahmad Dahlan and Abdul Wahab Khasbullah, founders of the two most prominent Islamic organizations in Indonesia, Muhammadiyah and NU. For him, these two ulama's paradigm represents and can be used to criticize religious radicalism(Setiawan, 2018). This understanding is also found in the critical discourse of the second group of former *Khilafah* ideologues.

The explanation above shows that two criticisms have been widely developed and become the dialectic of paradigm of the former *Khilafah* ideology. So, it is not a type of anomaly. What is missing in this form of criticism is a critique of tradition because criticism is rarely carried out when speaking about the issue of the *Khilafah*. As stated above, there are only two things: criticism of social life and criticism of *Siyasah* issues.

Paradigm Conception of *Ex-Khilafah* Ideologues

Several sub-conceptions of reason occurred after the dissolution of the former *Khilafah* Ideologue organization. As mentioned in the data presentation, two sub-mains are essential in reading the new paradigm that has grown after the dissolution of radical religious organizations. The paradigm between the two certainly has an anomalous relationship and a long dialectical process, as explained at the beginning. The two groups in question are those who remain firm in upholding the obligation to uphold the *Khilafah* but believe the organization has disbanded and groups that have holistically changed their religious paradigm.

First, the group that remained strong in fighting for the *Khilafah*. From the data collection, this group is a former HTI group that is currently still carrying out doctrinal activities and socializing the truth of the Islamic *Khilafah*. Some of them include communication forums for ulama who join Multaqa Aswaja. This group still believes in the obligations and truth of the Islamic *Khilafah*. The discourse developed is almost the same as the HTI doctrine.

Several previous experts have extensively researched this image of a paradigm group. Qohar and Hakiki, among others, research has illustrated that former *Khilafah* ideologues still adhere to their religious knowledge and awareness while in their organizations. However, in carrying out social and political movements, they have joined parties and other religious organizations (Qohar & Hakiki, 2017). Uswatun and Sangidun are also the same. He explained that former *Khilafah* ideologues were still socializing their beliefs and trying to enter society's social life without carrying organizational symbols (Uswatusolihah & Sangidun, 2018). Some figures from previous research are the same as what was found in this research. In short, this research's findings have confirmed previous researchers' findings. Their beliefs have mostly stayed the same.

This first group had religious paradigm similar to their paradigm when they were members of the *Khilafah* organization. The meaning of socio-cultural paradigm, *Siyasah*, and traditions are similar, as explained at the beginning. Regarding social culture, they persist in holding onto the values they believe in themselves. In *Siyasah*, they still do not believe in democracy and nationalism because they are Western products that do not follow Islamic teachings. Likewise, in terms of tradition, they prefer something other than the local consensus tradition.

The changing side of reason changes only based on the organization's actions. They no longer attach importance to organizational and group symbols. They further reduce group egoism. If mentioned in the previous ideology related to the movement to strengthen the *Khilafah*, there are three: Mashallah Tasqif, Mashallah Taf'ul, and achieving change. One of the ways this third process is carried out is by carrying out a coup against a political government deemed not to be fighting for sharia' (Aziz, 2019). When the organization was still officially established, the movement's paradigm believed that a coup was necessary. However, it was more about doing *Marhalah Tasqif* after it was disbanded. At best, some join communally with the agenda of the *Marhalah Taf'ul* movement.

So, there has been a change in the rationale for organizational actions in the *Khilafah* group. The movement's agenda no longer prioritizes political groups and is not oriented toward carrying out a coup. They are more focused on strengthening understanding regarding the *Khilafah* and attracting Islamic teachings to be confirmed as the only law in Indonesia. The most optimal thing is to hold recitation events not oriented towards reviving the organization.

Second, the group with a complete change in paradigm. This second group developed new paradigm more directed towards the values the Islamic boarding school or pesantren community and NU have developed. As many have said, these two elements are the source of values and perceptions of resistance to the Islamic *Khilafah*. Both are closely


related to religious perceptions and values, which are said to be the absorption of the ideology of Ahlussunnah wal Jama'ah.

So, social and traditional paradigm aligns with the two cultures of Pesantren and NU. What is meant is almost the same as what was explained by Afifuddin et al. His research stated that Islamic boarding schools have values and tend to "enforce the power in radical ways" (Afifuddin dkk., 2021). Irwan Masduki also said that Islamic boarding schools are considered centers of cultural resistance to acts of radicalism on religious grounds (Masduqi, 2013).

Likewise, the NU organization is more visible vis vis groups that want to fight for the Islamic *Khilafah*. Jauhari et al. illustrate that the *Khilafah* discourse is constantly at odds with NU's discourse (Jauhari dkk., 2021). Syarif Hidayatullah also found the same thing. This discourse happened because the paradigm built at NU was based on the value of moderation extracted from the Aswaja ideology (Hidayatullah, 2018). The findings are still confirmed as the new paradigm of this second group of *ex-Khilafah* ideologues.

To clarify the concept of this finding, the researcher describes it as follows:

Paradigm Shifting Pattern of Ex Ideologists Khilafah



Based on the picture above, there are two patterns of former *Khilafah* ideology groups, each of which has different paradigm. Some still fight for the *Khilafah*. This group still uses the same religious paradigm but has made a shift in the paradigm for its fighting actions. Initially, he felt obliged to carry out a political coup, then weakened just to cultivate perceptions and views. The second group is those who no longer fight for the *Khilafah*. This group patronized the movement and development of understanding of NU and pesantren. So, not all former ideologues have switched to new paradigm entirely and in the same way. They tend to be different. However, all former *Khilafah* ideologues experienced a transition. At a minimum, reducing egoism in upholding the *Khilafah* and the maximum is that they join religious organizations deemed not contrary to the national consensus.

CONCLUSION

Three forms of anomalies occurred among *ex-Khilafah* ideologues. First, socio-cultural anomalies occurred due to previous gaps in social and cultural perceptions and values. Second, the *Siyasah* anomaly, namely the form is a misunderstanding of the *Khilafah* and its compatibility with the actions of modern society. Third, the tradition anomaly refers to anomalies relate to differences in cultural values. It is more specific to the attitude towards local traditions and pesantren taught by the previous kiai, which have been strong.

The critical process occurs in two scopes: socio-cultural and criticism. In *Siyasah*, social and cultural criticism includes two things related to human morals and the rationality of benefits. Meanwhile, criticism in the field of *Siyasah* includes three things: criticism of the state's welfare related to Nationalistic brotherhood and criticism of the National Islamic Movement. These two critical processes are carried out in two directions; some are targeted at initial paradigm, and others are directed at paradigm criticism from the reality that occurs.

Meanwhile, the new form of paradigm consists of two patterns. First, some continue to fight for the *Khilafah*. This group only changed in terms of its struggle. Initially, there was an awareness of the necessity of a coup movement. After the organization's disbandment, beliefs decreased to only carrying out *Marbala Tsaqif* and *Taf'ul*. Second, they chose to no longer fight for the *Khilafah*. This group experienced a change in paradigm. They base their views on the majority, in this case, the religious understanding of NU and pesantren.

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