ISLAM STATE AND POLITICS IN ISLAMIC POLITICAL DISCIPLINE

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Abstract:
Historical reviews and analyses of the relationship between Islam, the state and politics are always interesting to discuss. A historical review would be significant for the discussion to show that an understanding of secularism, for example, is not a foreign idea in the history of Islamic societies. The purpose of this study is to provide confirmation that Islam does not only talk about worship. Islam is political and stately, the confidence of Islam in politics and state is proven based on historical facts and civilizations that are carved closely. This research is a literature research with a historical approach, so the data presented is the result of historical literature analysis. The results of the study explain that there is a separation between religious and political authority that can be traced back to the time of Abu Bakr as the first caliph of the state of Medina. The fact that this view does not prevail among Muslims does not mean that this view is in itself wrong. In fact, the crisis in relations between Islam and the state and politics that Muslims are experiencing today wherever they are, indicates the need for a new way of reading history. The conclusion of this study is that it is clear that the models of relations between religious authorities and the state vary from heightened state control over central religious institutions to more independent but cooperative relations, and full autonomy and even open opposition to state policies.

Keywords: *Islam, country, politics*

INTRODUCTION

Secularism, defined as the institutional separation between Islam and the state while maintaining its connection to politics, is more consistent with the history of Islamic societies than with the post-colonial idea of an Islamic state that can implement sharia through coercive state power. The separation of religious authority from state authority is an important safety shield against the possibility of abuse of Islam's political role. By proving that this kind of secularism is Islamic. There is no single Western model of secularism, as every Western society negotiates the relationship between religion and state and between religion and politics according to their historical context. It is also mistaken to understand that in supposedly secular European and North American countries, religion has been marginalized into the private sphere. It is clear that the relationship between the State and religion in Islamic societies is not much different from that of Western societies. To quote Ira Lapidus:

"There is a clear distinction between state and religious institutions in Islamic societies. Historical evidence shows that there is no single standard model of religious and state institutions in Islamic societies; There are a number of competing models. In fact, in every model there is a lack of clarity as to how authority is distributed, functioned and interacted between these institutions."(Lapidus, 1996, p. 4).

My emphasis on the differences in religious and state institutions in the history of Islamic societies does not mean that the past experiences of Islamic societies should serve as models for Islamic societies today and in the future. Such an idea is neither feasible nor desirable because today's Muslim society has a different context from

previous Muslim societies. Attempts to apply such historical experience would be inconsistent with assumptions about the importance of contextually positioning religion-state relations and religious and political relations.

RESEARCH METHODS

This research is a literature research with a historical approach, so that the data presented is the result of historical literature analysis. Data are taken from various sources, both sources in the form of books and pre-existing articles, then analyzed based on historical-hermeneutical approaches.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The Beginning of Mediation between Ideal Vision and Pragmatic Reality

The Prophet's Model of Leadership in Medina is too unique to replicate, I will focus this discussion by clarifying the significance of the Khulafaurrasyidin period (Abu Bakr, Ustman, Umar and Ali) in 632-661, and the Umayah period (661-750).[1]

This early history is in conjunction with two models of unification and negotiation of relations between Islam and the state as well as between Islam and politics. In the second part I will briefly examine some of the events and consequences of the *mihnah events* that began during the time of Caliph al-Ma'mun in 833 and continued by later rulers in relation to the question we discussed. Because these events emphasize the importance of distinguishing between Islam and the state, as well as the institutional and financial power of religious institutions, and the autonomy of scholars in negotiating Islam's relationship with the state and politics.

As with other Muslims, it is difficult for me to offer analytical reflection on this early phase of Islamic history because of the high respect given to the Companions involved in the events of that time. How can I make a wrong judgment against Abu Bakr, the most respected companion of the Prophet among Sunni Muslims, when he decided to wage war against apostates or better known as *hurūb al-ridā*, or judge how he dealt with the problem of Khalid bin al-Walid because of his behavior during the conquest? How can I criticize Muawiya, another companion who founded the Umayyad dynasty? However, as a Muslim I must also reflect on these figures and their behavior because I believe in the importance of solving the problems faced by Muslims now and in the future. Because as a Muslim I don't want to shy away from responsibility by just staying away from these kinds of issues. I am honored to express such views and because I do so for mutual benefit, not for personal gain.

The process of changing the leadership of the Prophet is a topic that has remained hotly debated throughout the history of Islamic societies because of its profound implications for the nature of the state and its relationship with Islam. The generally accepted sequence of events is that the claims *of the Muhajirūn* group are stronger than those of the *Anshar* group. The accounts that show that the ansars demanded leaders from these two different groups show that they were concerned about the risk of a consolidated government, rather than a reaction against Abu Bakr or anything like that. This fact will be relevant to understand the reasons for the revolt of other Arab tribes that were crushed through the riddah wars which we will discuss below.

When this first issue was resolved, Abu Bakr had a stronger influence among the Muslims of Makkah at that time than any other candidate, until Umar called it "unplanned coincidence". An important point that has always been controversial in this process is that some Muslims at that time, who came to be known as Ali's supporters, continued to challenge the validity of Abu Bakr's victory over Ali. What is more significant in our current conversation is that the different reasons for choosing the successor of the Prophet and the selection criteria have tremendous consequences on the nature of the state as a political institution. Problems relating to the position of the caliph and its relation to the time of the Prophet continued to have great consequences for the nature of the state itself. I will now discuss this issue through an analysis of the

war of apostates and the important role of these events in shaping the nature of the state as a political institution. Another controversial thing that happened at the time was Abu Bakr's decision to appoint Meccan aristocrats as commanders in the war *Riddah,* even though they only converted to Islam after years of hostility and rejection of prophetic messages (Donner, 2014).

The decision shows the political side of Abu Bakr's campaign because "the surrender of zakat can mean a sign of surrender of tribal autonomy, revenue to official taxes as well as recognition of the right of the state to coerce dissidents and subjugation of the tribe to the ruler or government.

These things, precisely what have always been opposed by them (Madelung, 1997, p. 47). It was this appreciation of the tensions and fears of the Arab tribes facing drastic transformations in their social and political institutions and relations that probably led to the Prophet never being interested in using force. "When the leaders of the tribal rebellion were caught and confronted by Bakar and charged with apostasy, they defended themselves by saying that by committing this act of resistance they did not intend to become infidels, but because they did not want to give up their wealth." (Shaddel, n.d.).

Another event that caused controversy was Abu Bakr's order to Khalid bin al-Walid to kill Malik bin Nuwayra of Banu Yarbu, an Arab tribe that was a member of the Banu Tamim federation. This order arose because Malik ibn Nuwayra refused to hand over the number of camels he had collected to give as zakat to his people to the Prophet. Although Malik declared his allegiance to Islam, he, along with other tribesmen, was killed by Khalid. Khalid then took Malik's wife and apparently treated her as "spoils of war" (Blankinship, 1993).

Prominent Companions condemned Khalid's actions. Even Umar demanded that the caliph depose him and Ali decreed punishment *hād* against him because Khalid was considered to have committed adultery (by forcibly taking Malik's wife) (Madelung, 1997). But Abu Bakr as Caliph did not grant both requests (Ja'fari, 2014). These demands would seem absurd if we understood Abu Bakr's decision as part of the religious authority he had from the Prophet because the prominent Companions, of course, would not have quarreled with him, because they understood that Abu Bakr's decision was binding and part of the teachings of Islam. But on the contrary, although the Companions did not agree with Abu Bakr, they did not do what they wanted to realize what they thought was right, perhaps because they respected Abu Bakr's political authority as caliph.

In fact we want to clarify the vagueness and risk of using state cursive power to implement one's opinion about religion. This ambiguity can be clarified if we understand the issue in the context of Abu Bakr's role as a political leader and not as a religious leader. This reading may not be consistent with Abu Bakr's perhaps religious motivations, as he believed that he was defending Islam at the time, and not merely maintaining the integrity of the state as a political institution. Maybe he hasn't even understood what the state means in the context of our talks.

On the other hand, the willingness of the Companions to submit to Abu Bakr's decision even though they were convinced that it was wrong may also have been motivated by political factors, especially the need to consolidate and secure the community during those critical periods. But religious reasons can also be put forward to reinforce such factors as Qs, 4:59 which is commonly used to demand the obedience of the Islamic ummah towards Allah, His Messenger and ruler. In other words, a Muslim has an obligation to obey the caliph, even if he thinks that the caliph is wrong. But then this obligation can clash with the Muslim obligation to uphold justice and fight against hypocrisy (*al-amr bil ma'rūf wa l-nahy an al-munkar*). It is also said in the Sunnah that no human being should obey the command to do impiety to Allah (*la tā'ata li makhlūq fī ma'siyat al-khāliq*).

Thus, with any justification, it seems that separating religion from politics remains difficult: Muslims will always disagree with these two things and religious reasons will always contain political considerations and vice versa. With regard to the war on

apostates, it is possible that Abu Bakr's actions were legitimate in the Islamic view because his decision was based on the grounds that they had apostatized or rebelled against the state. Both of these are grave crimes (*hadd al-haraba* in Qs. 5:33-34) and the perpetrators deserve the death penalty. Whatever the reason and despite the objections of the other Companions, Abu Bakr was able to carry out his decision because he was a caliph, but not because he had a correct or correct decision in the lens of Islam. This does not mean that Abu Bakr was right or wrong, but because there was no independent authority that could resolve or mediate his disagreements with other companions. In other words, if Umar or Ali had become caliphs the result would have been very different.

The conclusion for us is that distinguishing between Abu Bakr's religious views and his political decisions and actions as caliph may be decisive. This distinction of pubs can be useful in understanding some of the great companions who disagreed with Abu Bakr because they could also have religious and political reasons. This distinction needs to be maintained regardless of the religious motivations of Abu Bakr or other companions, because a person's actions cannot be determined by his motivations. Such a distinction may still be difficult for Muslims to apply to read the history of the Medina period because, at that time, the nature of political authority was still personal and the state was still not considered a political institution. The difficulties could also be due to various factors including the new example left by the Prophet, the limitations of the establishment of the state in the Arab regions at the time and the way the four caliphs were elected and exercised their power. In essence, whatever the view of these events, such vagueness cannot be justified or accepted in the context of the current European model of postcolonial states.

The vagueness of the political and religious authority of a caliph could no longer be maintained after Ali's assassination and the beginning of the Umayah state. Although Umayah was a monarchy, he still tried to maintain the impression that the authority of the caliph was an extension of the authority of the Prophet. The titles used by the caliphs of the Umayyad dynasty such as *khalifat allah,* amen *allah*, *na'ib allah* indicate the magnitude and greatness of religious authority possessed by the caliph. These titles of authority are always announced ahead of Friday sermons in all areas they control. However, the religious legitimacy of Muawiya, the founder of this dynasty, was weakened not only by his confrontation with Ali which ended in the killing of the Prophet's nephew, but also by the soft and hard efforts he made to smooth the election of Yazid as his successor, even though Yazid did not have the qualifications to become caliph. As Yazid faced the threat of increasing levels of rebellion and disorder aimed at destabilizing his authority and legitimacy as a Muslim ruler, he resorted to using force to suppress dissidents. Unfortunately, this action even further reduced his poor qualifications.

In an attempt to suppress the revolts, he ordered the killing of Husayn ibn Ali, the Prophet's grandson, his family and his supporters in Karbala. At the same time, around 681 AD, Abdullah ibn Zubayr, grandson of Abu Bakr and son of another prominent companion, and his supporters came up with another rebellion and he claimed himself as caliph in Mecca and Medina. This rebellion was successfully suppressed by the army of the Umayah dynasty for 10 years. Mecca and Medina, even the Kaaba, were destroyed by the crackdown. This crisis continued throughout the eight decades of rule of the Umayyad dynasty and beyond (Crone & Hinds, 2003).

The permanent paradox faced by the Umayyad dynasty and subsequent regimes was that they sought to satisfy their need for religious legitimacy by attempting to replicate the Prophet's model of rule or the rule of Khulafa al-Rashidun in Medina. Ironically, this problem is compounded by the ruler's desire to consolidate its power over society, which undermines their religious legitimacy. The Abbasid revolution succeeded against the Umayyad dynasty because they claimed that it lacked religious legitimacy and claimed to establish an ideal system for Muslims. However, it was clear then that the Caliphate had already been institutionalized into a royal dynasty whose rulers were chosen by lineage, which was nothing more than an adaptation of the

monarchical model of the Sasanid and Byzantine dynasties (Lapidus, 1996).

The Arab kingdoms that sprang up were relatively less complicated, as the state apparatus and its successors usually adopted Sasanid and Byzantine dynastic structures and often continued to employ the same officials as the previous regime. To maintain their religious legitimacy, the Abbasid caliphs, especially those in power in the early periods, often positioned themselves as curators of religious sciences and participants in their interpretation efforts (Zaman, 1997, pp. 129–166).

Ironically, they made or gave rise to that expectation by basing their power claims on his kinship with the Prophet, so that they were deemed worthy to re-practice his model. The caliphs of the early Abbasid dynasty sought to maintain the unity of religious and political leadership by appointing judges (*qādi*), mastering religious institutions and sciences, and portraying themselves as military defenses of the Islamic empire. However, attempts to enforce a model of unification between political authority and state became useless, due to several tragic events that came to be known as *mihnah*.

Implications of *Mihnah* on Political and Religious Authority and Institutions

The discrepancy between the Islamic ideal of uniting religious and political leadership and the empirical reality of the history of the Muslim ummah became apparent, even before the Kharijite and Shi'a uprisings. The political problems faced by Khulafaurrasyidun in Medina are clear evidence that the ideal structure commanded by the Prophet is not suitable for replication. "Implicitly, the presence of the rebels is a sign of the emergence of Islamic groups that broke away from the authority and leadership of the caliphate" (Lapidus, 1975, p. 366).

The growth of a number of sects such as Qadiriyah, Murjiah, and others challenged the myth of the unity of Islam. Moreover, if you consider the emergence of drastic events better known as mihnah through a social history perspective. The conflict between the authority of the caliph and the clergy must be seen in the context of social relations between 3 groups, namely: the Arab elite representing the Caliph's court and its administrative apparatus, religious leaders, and the descendants of the Khurasan rebels who initiated the success of the Abbasid revolution.

It is also important to distinguish between the ideal caliphate and its Abbasid reality. It was a hybrid mixture of Pre-Islamic Middle Eastern (Sasanid and Byzantine) Kingdoms and Islamic universalism. The caliphs sought to combine the religious authority of the successor of the Prophet with the form of empire and institutional and cultural authority of the Middle Eastern Kingdom. This tendency was evident in the Umayyad dynasty's patronage of Byzantine artistry, architecture and celebration in the royal palace" and in other royal projects, as well as their crude style of expansion. Meanwhile, the Abasids imitated the Persian model by patronizing the literary treasures of the Pahlavi dynasty and Hellenistic philosophy." (Lapidus, 1996). In response, the scholars of the early period pointed out a disconnect between ideal mind and reality, and doubted the claim of authority of the caliphs to interpret or elaborate the Shari'ah.

This claim reflects the fact that clerics have greater influence among Muslims than the caliphs. "Thus, the independence of religious authority from the power of the caliph developed along with the emergence of sectarian groups within the Islamic ummah. From a communal religious point of view, the Caliphate and Islam are no longer integrated." (Lapidus, 1975). It was this emergence of religious authority independent of the caliph and the state apparatus, which Lapidus called the distinction between political and religious authority in the history of Islamic societies.

The so-called *mihnah* was a theological inquisition that aimed to make the members of the group of scholars, who at that time a united group without any particular purpose, agree with the attitude taken by the Mu'tazilites that the Qur'an was a creation of Allah and thus it was an attribute and not words not created by Him. This issue is part of an ongoing debate between groups that prefer a more allegorical and

rational approach to Islamic sources (Mu'tazilites) and other groups (ahl-alhadith and Ash'ariah) who adhere to a textual approach to the text. In this context, Caliph al-Ma'mun carried out the inquisition in 833 CE (218 AH) to force certain scholars to adopt the views of the mu'tazilites. Even after al-Ma'mun's death, the Inquisition continued until the time of the three caliphs after him for 16 years. Caliph al-Mutawakkil ended the sentence by releasing clerics who were not subject to the caliph's previous policies from prison and placing several of them in his government.

Al-Ma'mun came to power after winning a civil war with his brother al-Amin. Both al-Ma'mun and al-Amin were sons of Caliph Harun al-Rashid. Surprisingly, al-Ma'mun appointed Imam al-Rida, the eighth Imam in the twelfth Shi'a Imamate, as his successor. This was an attempt to calm the continuing Shi'a rebellion at the time, or to restore the caliphate to its original formulation as a religious and political institution. He also adopted Shi'a green for his army's attributes. But these two decisions were overturned soon after al-Rida's mysterious death. When al-Ma'mun returned to Baghdad, which was in turmoil, he attempted to impose a certain theology on society, which, instead of increasing his power, depleted the authority of his caliphate. The severe chaos in Baghdad was caused by competing groups for power as well as an angry and disgruntled army. The situation is exacerbated by the presence of criminal gangs and criminals. This turmoil ended with the emergence of a number of movements that further confirmed the fact that the unification of religious and political leadership was no longer relevant to practice.

For example, Sahl bin Salama al-Ansari, a resident of Baghdad "who wears a copy of the Qur'an around his neck and calls on people to do *'amar ma'ruf nahyi munkar'*, managed to attract a number of followers from all corners of the city who came from different backgrounds. He also called on his followers to not only defend their surroundings by providing security and stability to their dwellings, but also to implement the teachings of the Qur'an and Sunnah brought by the Prophet. Sahl described adherence to higher principles that provided justification for resisting the caliph and state authorities who failed to uphold Islam. He called for adherence to the Qur'an and Sunnah to defeat obedience to authority that fails to uphold Islam." (Lapidus, 1975). He adopted the slogan 'there is no obedience to beings when to do ma'siat to Allah' (*la tā'ata li makhlūq fī ma'siyat al-khāliq*). His followers in various parts of the city built towers in front of their houses that served to fortify them in the city." (Lapidus, 1975). Thus, the community-based organization that Sahl established represented the spontaneous emergence of a government of a militant religious nature and an open rejection of the caliph's authority.

Using religious language, the movement managed to "draw sentiments that were outside the confines of the caliph's rule into a communal conception of Islam. It is in this context that movements outside such a system represent a revolutionary conception of the structure of Islamic society." (Lapidus, 1975). Obligation to carry out *'amar ma'ruf nahyi munkar*' is essentially an obligation of the caliph, but the Sahl movement is supported by many scholars who believe that it is also the duty of all Muslims.

This movement, thus, used a symbol of strong religious authority and the excuse that the obligation was left vacant by an incompetent ruler. One of the leading clerics involved in the movement was Ahmad bin Hanbal who coincidentally was a resident in one corner of Baghdad providing his own security and stability (Lapidus, 1975). Thus, the social forces represented by Sahl and others emerged alongside the theological independence of scholars such as Ahmad bin Hanbal and his followers such as Ahmad bin Nasr bin Malik (both were residents of the city of Baghdad represented by Sahl and other opponents of the caliph

It was Ahmad bin Nasr who led the movement of opposition to the policy *Mihnah* during the reign of al-Watsiq and which revived the Sahl movement which faded after al-Ma'mun entered Baghdad again. In the following period, the same slogan, which proclaimed the opposition of the religious authorities to the caliphate, continued to appear and flourish by organizing mass recruitment for the rebellious movement.

However, such efforts were halted due to poor planning by Ahmad ibn Nasr's followers and because he himself was eventually arrested along with a number of his followers. It is important to note that Ahmad bin Nasr was prosecuted for his religious views and not for charges of sedition. He was later executed and had his head put on public display to warn others of the punishment he would receive for disobeying the caliph (Lapidus, 1975).

The protracted Inquisition saw a confrontation between the clergy and the caliph in claiming religious authority. Ahmad ibn Hanbal's refusal to accept the religious claims of the caliph led to his imprisonment for the rest of his life, justifying the rejection of the unification of state and religious authority. as Lapidus expressed:

"The debate about the status of beings of the Qur'an confirms the institutional separation of the caliph and the community, the separation of authority between the two while assigning different roles to each that the Prophet previously had. Thus, in contrast to the idealized image of the Islamic ummah, the Caliphate developed into royal and military institutions legitimized by Byzantine and Sasanid means, while the clergy developed more complete authority over communal, personal, religious and doctrinal aspects of Islam." (Lapidus, 1996).

The issue that we will discuss and in accordance with the purpose of our discussion is about the relationship between the Muslim community and the Muslim country. How are those relationships formed in different regimes and locations? How does it change all the time? How much influence do scholars have on the development of the country? How much control does the state have over clerics and religious communities? (Lapidus, 1975). However, it is also important to emphasize that the distinction between religious and political institutions was not yet known to the majority of Muslims at that time.

However, this institutional separation turned out to have the support of a number of scholars such as al-Baqullani, al-Mawardi and Ibn Taymiah. "The result of their terrorization is that the state is not a direct expression of Islam. It is a secular institution tasked with upholding Islam; The true community of Muslims is the community of scholars and saints who practice the sunnah of the apostle in their lives." (Lapidus, 1996). This view is in line with my suggestion to implement secularism as a principle that maintains state neutrality towards religion while maintaining the connection between Islam and politics.

The distortion between Islam and the state was well consolidated through the emergence of military control of the caliphate at the same time. The difficulties of the Abbasid caliphs in managing the internal problems of the caliphate ended in declining loyalty and loyalty to the institution of the caliphate in Baghdad. In response to Shi'a and Kharijite revolts in almost all areas of the kingdom, the Abbasid caliph employed slave soldiers to strengthen his power. Dependence on the Mamluks as an army began during the reign of al-Mu'tasim (833-42), the period after the outbreak of chaos during al-Ma'mun's reign as caliph (Petry, 2014, p. 15). Non-Arab armies and military commanders had little allegiance to the caliphate as an institution, and tended to regard its position as a source of political power and economic gain. Expected to be an effective military machine, the Mamluks were encouraged not to interact with the civilian population and remain positioned as a foreign power.

For example, commanders from the Buwaihi tribe from the Caspian region of Iran entered Baghdad in 945. Although Shi'a, they supported and sided with the caliph al-Mustakfi. The Buwaihi tribe tried to manage different religious trends in Baghdad by protecting the Shi'ite minority. They also used state authority to support Imam Husayn's martyrdom procession and made the official commemoration *of īdul ghādir* , a controversial event in Islamic history that the Shi'ites regard as the day Ali was appointed as the successor to the Prophet's leadership.

However, the tribe also maintains complete tolerance for Sunnis by supporting its main institutions, not interfering in its ritual affairs and striving to emerge as a neutral leader in an atmosphere of division. The most important thing is that the institution of the caliphate is maintained until the Sunni character attached to the kingdom and

regime remains. But less than a century later, after internal conflict among the Buywaihi disrupted their ability to rule, Seljuk forces, with ambitions of establishing a dynasty, occupied Baghdad and supported the Sunni masses and their clerics to claim to be the guardians of orthodoxy.

From then on, clerics handed over political or military authority to outside military regimes. Whether it was Saljuk, Ayyubid, Mamluk or Ottoman, it retained its authority over religious institutions, doctrines and practices. What I call the negotiation model then strengthened with two large institutions working in mutually beneficial relationships; Ulema support a military state while the state protects Muslim areas. Military dignitaries and prominent civilian officials secured their cooperation with religious communities through endowments of religious schools, mosques, and other Muslim community institutions. This model continued into the pre-colonial period, and its remnants still exist today as seen in the dominance of military culture in Muslim lands.

While such a model prevailed in Baghdad and surrounding areas, another model of governance prevailed in North Africa. The Fatimid dynasty began its rule in 909 in Tunisia when Ubaidillah al-Mahdi, an Ismaili Shi'ite, claimed to be the sole legitimate heir of the Prophet from the descendants of Ali and Fatimah *(ahl al-bayt).* The movement, as we will discuss later, seeks to re-establish the unification of religious and political leadership. But the Fatimid dynasty was just one example of a trend that prevailed in the North African region at the time as the region had been dominated by such a leadership model since the fall of the Umayyad dynasty.

Muslim rulers of various regimes in North Africa such as the Idrisid, Fatimid, *al-Murabithun*, and *al-Muwahhidun* dynasties claimed divine authority to rule based on the individual qualifications and descendants of the Prophet. The Idrisid and Fatimid dynasties were Shi'a and very authoritarian. Even the Fatimid dynasty claimed to be free from sin. On the other hand, the leaders of the *al-Murabithun* and *al-Muwahhidun* movements, Shaykhs Abdullah Yasin and Abdullah bin Tumart, only sought to carry out a rigid form of Islam.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion of this section, it is clear that the models of relations between religious authorities and the state vary from high state control over central religious institutions to more independent but cooperative relations, and full autonomy and even open opposition to state policies. I will attempt to clarify and illustrate this view by referring to the historical experience of Egypt from the ninth to fourteenth centuries AD.

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